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ABSTRACT 
 
Background: The pharmaceutical industry has been responsible for major medical advances, 
but the industry has also been heavily criticized. Such criticisms, and associated regulatory 
responses, are no doubt often warranted, but do not provide a framework for those who 
wish to reason systematically about the moral dimensions of drug development. We set out 
to develop such a framework using Beauchamp and Childress’s “four principles” as 
organizing categories.  
Methods: We conducted a qualitative interview study of people working in the “medical 
affairs” departments of pharmaceutical companies to determine: (1) whether our data 
could meaningfully be organized under the headings of “autonomy,” “beneficence,” “non-
maleficence,” and “justice”; (2) how principles might be expressed in this particular 
commercial setting; and (3) if these principles are expressed, whether and how competing 
principles are balanced. We then critiqued these findings using existing normative theory. 
Results: Our interviews demonstrated that three of Beauchamp and Childress’ four 
principles were salient to our participants: beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. 
Within each of these principles, participants had two broad ethical orientations: an altruistic 
public focus (“other-ness”) and a commitment to their companies (“firm-ness”). Our 
participants also demonstrated efforts to balance these principles and highlighted the 
importance of phronesis (or practical wisdom) in balancing and enacting principles. Notably, 
however, our participants did not spontaneously emphasize the importance of autonomy. 
Conclusions: It is possible to use qualitative empirical research, together with normative 
analysis, to derive a framework for pharmaceutical ethics.  We suggest that our framework 
would be useful for those who wish to reason ethically within, or in collaboration with, the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Keywords: Empirical ethics, principle-based ethics, pharmaceutical industry, pharmaceutical 
ethics, qualitative research 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Need for a Framework for Pharmaceutical Ethics 
It is widely acknowledged that the pharmaceutical industry has been responsible for 
many major medical advances, but the industry has also been heavily criticized for (among 
other things) developing medicines that are likely to be commercially beneficial even if 
these do not address genuine unmet needs; carrying out research without sufficient 
concern for the wellbeing of research participants; distorting the design, conduct, 
interpretation, and presentation of research in order to produce more positive results; 
overstating the costs involved in research and development in order to over-price 
medicines; abusing intellectual property laws; and engaging in ethically suspect marketing 
practices (see e.g., Angell 2004; Elliot 2010). Public trust in the pharmaceutical industry has 
been shown to be correspondingly low (Brown and Calnan 2012), and many members of the 
public think that the industry needs to be more heavily regulated (Harris Poll 2010).  
It is in this context that the field of “pharmaceutical ethics” has emerged. For the 
most part, pharmaceutical ethics has been concerned with the ways in which the 
pharmaceutical industry influences and distorts biomedical research, publication, 
policymaking, and clinical practice, and the ways in which these distortions can be managed 
(Lo 2012; Raad and Appelbaum 2012). Ethics has thus contributed to the development of 
numerous regulations governing, for example, the conduct of clinical research (Califf et al. 
2012); marketing practices (Mackenzie et al. 2007; Tabarrok 2009); drug pricing and 
patenting (Blind 2012); and industry engagement with academic researchers, clinicians, 
regulators, and funding bodies (DeMartino 2012).  
It has been argued recently that pharmaceutical ethics is currently limited in that it 
focuses too much on professional conflicts of interest and does not make sufficient use of 
insights from clinical ethics, public health ethics, and business ethics (Brody 2012). One 
reason for this narrowness of focus might be that, at present, there is no clear framework 
that can be used by those involved in drug development to think systematically through 
moral problems as they arise in practice.  
A number of ethical frameworks have been developed specifically for those working 
in, or with, the pharmaceutical industry—such as the set of principles that has been 
proposed for pharmaceutical physicians who are members of the Faculty of Pharmaceutical 
Medicine of the Royal College of Physicians of the UK (Bickerstaffe et al. 2006), or those 
suggested for project collaboration between academics and the pharmaceutical industry 
(Riis 2012). But these tend to be more rules than general principles, taking the form of 
statements such as “Pharmaceutical physicians must treat information about patients and 
research subjects as confidential” (Bickerstaffe et al. 2006), or specific behavioural guides, 
such as the need to include contractual descriptions of all procedures in academia-industry 
protocols (Riis 2012). While these rules might be useful behavioural guides, they do not 
allow for much analytic flexibility or reflection. 
Weber has provided some insight into what a pharmaceutical ethics might look like 
from the perspective of business ethics (Weber 2006). He has argued that the industry 
needs to do more than comply with law and regulation, and also focus on fulfilling its 
responsibilities to stakeholders—particularly avoiding practices that place stakeholders at 
unnecessary risk of harm. He then suggests a number of specific ethical “responsibilities” 
such as limiting “gifts” to physicians and providing clear, accurate, and useful information to 
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doctors and the public. While Weber’s framework is richer than the prescriptive rules 
described above, it still moves very quickly from the general (the need to respect and 
protect all stakeholders) to the specific (e.g., the need to separate pharmaceutical 
marketing from continuing medical education) without providing much guidance as to how 
to generate the specific from the general or how to balance competing commitments to one 
or more stakeholders. 
This lack of a satisfactory framework for ethical reasoning is a problem both for 
those within the industry, and for those outside the industry, who currently have no 
framework for engaging with members of industry in shared moral deliberation. While some 
degree of skepticism about the motives of industry is inevitable and healthy, no one 
benefits from sustained mistrust, suspicion, and reluctance or inability to engage in shared 
moral deliberation.   
This raises the question: how might we develop an ethical framework that can be 
used by those working in the pharmaceutical industry and those who need or want to 
engage with the industry more productively? One framework that has been particularly 
successful in the biomedical setting is that of “principle-based ethics.” In the remainder of 
this section, we describe principle-based ethics and argue for the value in developing a 
“principle-based pharmaceutical ethics.” 
 
The Success of Principle-Based Biomedical Ethics 
Those attempting to resolve morally charged controversies in biomedical research 
and clinical practice have made good use of a number of normative ethical theories. One 
normative framework that has been particularly influential in biomedicine has been 
principle-based ethics (sometimes referred to as “principlism”). The best known version of 
principle-based ethics is that developed by Beauchamp and Childress, who identified four 
key guiding principles: respect for autonomy (e.g., allowing people to make informed, 
uncoerced decisions); beneficence (doing good and preventing harm); non-maleficence (not 
inflicting harm); and justice (e.g., aiming for a decent minimum of health care for all) 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2009).  
According to Beauchamp and Childress, none of these principles is considered to be 
foundational, and principle-based ethics is not intended to replace other normative ethical 
theories. Rather, principles are viewed as four coordinated prima facie binding clusters of 
moral principles, which are part of a framework consisting of principles, rules, rights, virtues, 
and moral ideals (Beauchamp and Childress 2009). These principles are, by definition, 
abstract, content-thin and therefore indeterminate on their own in practical situations 
(Gordon et al. 2011). Beauchamp and Childress have thus described techniques for 
specifying and enriching abstract principles in particular contexts, and for balancing 
principles when they conflict (Beauchamp and Childress 2009). Beauchamp and Childress 
also emphasize the fact that principles are subject to constant, dialectical revision in light of 
contrary arguments or evidence from particular cases. They invoke the Aristotelian concept 
of phronesis, or practical wisdom, to describe this dialectical process.  
Importantly, Beauchamp and Childress’s principles were derived empirically, from a 
detailed analysis of the considered moral judgments of those attempting to resolve ethical 
dilemmas in biomedicine, while at the same time drawing upon insights from a cross-
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cultural “common morality”: “the set of norms shared by all persons committed to morality” 
(Atkins et al. 2008; Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 3). This method was derived from Rawls’ 
“Wide Reflective Equilibrium” (WRE), a method for developing and justifying principles for a 
just society which aims for coherence among (1) the particular moral sensibilities and 
judgments of “competent judges”; (2) reasoning from first principles; and (3) general 
convictions about, for example, sociology and psychology (Rawls 2001). Although 
Beauchamp and Childress did not refer explicitly to their approach to deriving principles as 
“empirical bioethics” they clearly demonstrated the potential for empirical research to 
contribute not only to resolving specific normative dilemmas, but also to generating and 
specifying ethical theory. 
While Beauchamp and Childress’ principles have been highly influential in 
biomedicine, the principle-based approach has been subject to a number of criticisms. On a 
practical level, it has been argued that biomedical practitioners and researchers do not 
actually use principles to analyze ethically challenging situations (Ebbesen and Pedersen 
2007). At the meta-ethical level, critics have challenged the idea there is a foundational, 
globally applicable common morality from which principles can be derived (Gert 2007; 
Herissone-Kelly 2011; Karlsen and Solbakk 2011; Lee 2010). Others have argued that we 
need a single, deductively derived, organizing theory, such as Kant’s categorical imperative 
or the Utilitarian principle if principles are to provide a clear guide to action (Lee 2010; 
Herissone-Kelly 2011; Lee 2010; Strong 2000). At the same time, principle-based ethics has 
been criticized for being too determinate, imposing a rigorous and excessively uniform grid 
on moral thinking, and being insufficiently attuned to the cognitive and emotional 
complexities of moral reasoning and decision making (Smith and Dubbink 2011). Each of 
these criticisms has been countered, but no final resolution has been reached and principle-
based ethics remains controversial. 
Notwithstanding these ongoing debates, principle-based biomedical ethics remains 
one of the most influential frameworks for moral reasoning in biomedicine and for teaching 
bioethics (Ebbesen and Pedersen 2007). For better or worse, principles are enduring, 
resilient, productive, and adaptive to new situations (Lustig 1992) and, at the very least, 
provide a valuable heuristic for understanding why biomedicine is as it is (both good and 
bad), and for justifying—if not determining—decisions and actions in medicine, public 
health, medical research, health service management, and health policy (Hine 2011). 
Given the success of principle-based ethics in other biomedical settings, it seems 
worth developing a set of principles for pharmaceutical ethics in order to help those in the 
pharmaceutical industry, and those interacting with the industry, to conceptualize and work 
through ethical dilemmas that emerge in the context of commercial drug development.  
Beauchamp and Childress claim that their principles are derived from a common 
morality, and therefore are universally applicable to all types of medicine (Herissone-Kelly 
2011). Rather, therefore, than starting from scratch and deriving our principles a priori, we 
decided to use Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles as an organizing framework for 
developing a principle-based pharmaceutical ethics. 
To develop our framework, we conducted a qualitative interview study of people working in 
the pharmaceutical industry with a view to determining: 
(1) Whether our data could meaningfully be organized under the headings of 
“autonomy,” “beneficence,” “non-maleficence,” and “justice” 
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(2) How principles might be expressed in this particular commercial setting and  
(3) Whether and how competing principles are balanced to cope with moral conflict. 
 
We chose to focus our analysis on those working in the “medical affairs” 
departments of pharmaceutical companies (i.e., those responsible for clinical trials, 
regulatory affairs, and health economics) because they are the groups most likely to 
participate in policy-related dialogue with clinicians, academic scientists, and regulators. 
 
METHODS 
We conducted 15 face-to-face interviews with people working in the medical and 
drug development departments of nine pharmaceutical companies in Sydney Australia. In 
Australia, almost all pharmaceutical companies are local subsidiaries of global companies. 
Our participants represented most of the major companies that have an Australian 
presence, as well as one manufacturer of generic medicines. We used a purposive sampling 
procedure to include participants from as many different companies as possible; from a 
variety of (non-commercial) professional backgrounds, particularly academic research, 
clinical medicine, and pharmacy; and with a variety of pharmaceutical company roles, 
including medical director, clinical research manager, regulatory affairs manager, and 
pricing and reimbursement manager (several participants currently or had previously held 
more than one of these positions) [Table 1]. Interviewees were identified first through 
organizational websites and the professional contacts of the research team and then via 
snowball sampling from the initial group. Sixteen people were approached in total and one 
declined to be interviewed. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted by the first author in late 2011 and early 
2012 and lasted approximately one hour each. Interviews were recorded (with interviewees’ 
permission) and transcribed verbatim.  
Participants were told that we wanted to hear about the pharmaceutical industry 
from the perspective of those intimately involved with it and that we were interested in 
their perspectives and experiences. Participants were first asked to describe, in their own 
words, their decision to move out of science or clinical practice and into industry and their 
experiences of making the transition. They were asked how they learned to fulfill their new 
roles and responsibilities, and whether they had been influenced by any role models. They 
were asked to describe people they admired and people of whom they disapproved, and to 
discuss those aspects of their work they found most and least rewarding. Finally, they were 
asked for their opinions on issues surrounding drug development, such as the globalization 
of clinical research, the current regulatory and economic environment, and relationships 
between industry and academia. Through this loosely structured format, participants were 
able to define and discuss their careers and the process of drug development as they 
wished.  
A number of interesting findings emerged from this phase of the research, including 
that our participants’ discussions were rich in statements about what it means to be 
“virtuous” and that our participants used a number of psychological strategies to cope with 
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the tensions inherent in their work. These findings have been published/accepted for 
publication elsewhere.  
We emphasize that at this stage of the research we did not yet know that we would 
be interested in explicating ethical principles. Our only research question at this stage was: 
“What matters to those working in the ‘medical affairs’ departments of pharmaceutical 
companies?” In this sense our approach was different to that of Beauchamp and Childress, 
who derived their principles from observing the ways in which people resolved moral 
dilemmas.  
Once we had made the decision to develop a principle-based pharmaceutical ethics 
using Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles as an organizing framework, we then 
returned to our data and “read for” findings that might fit under the headings of 
“autonomy,” “beneficence,” “non-maleficence,” and “justice.” As mentioned previously, our 
goal was not so much to “discover” these principles in our data as to confirm their 
appropriateness as an organizing framework and describe in detail how they played out in 
the particular context of the pharmaceutical industry. 
We drew both on Morse’s outline of the cognitive basis of qualitative research 
(Morse 1994) and on Charmaz’s outline of data analysis in grounded theory (Charmaz 2006). 
This procedure involved initial coding via line-by-line analysis, synthesizing codes into 
categories until no new codes could be developed from the data, focused coding using these 
categories, and abstracting into concepts.  A coding tree was generated. Throughout the 
data analysis, a process of constant comparison was employed. Existing codes, categories, 
and concepts were refined, enriched, and reorganized as new data emerged. Enough 
material was analyzed to ensure that categories were saturated and all concepts were fully 
described and well understood. Thematic saturation was reached after approximately eight 
interviews. Coding was conducted independently by both authors, and agreement was 
reached on the major themes, categories, and concepts. In each case we asked ourselves 
whether a particular concept could reasonably be interpreted as an expression of 
“autonomy,” “beneficence,” “non-maleficence,” or “justice.” 
The study was approved by the University of New South Wales research ethics 
committee. All participants signed consent forms and agreed to speak from their own 
(rather than their company’s) perspective. 
 
RESULTS  
Our interviews demonstrated that three of Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles 
were salient: “beneficence,” “non-maleficence,” and “justice.” Autonomy was notably 
absent. We will address this finding (or lack thereof) in the Discussion. Within each of these 
principles, participants had two broad ethical orientations: an altruistic public focus (“other-
ness”) and a commitment to their companies (“firm-ness”).  
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Beneficence 
Publicly-oriented beneficence 
Our participants strongly emphasized the need to be altruistic, idealistic, and committed to 
the wellbeing of patients and the community. Indeed, this was the most common reason 
given for choosing to work in the pharmaceutical industry.  
P3: Very often you do know somebody with one of these conditions, and it’s a feel 
good factor that…you can be proud of what you do, feeling like you’re contributing 
to the wellbeing of your fellow humans. Really that's it.   
 
Participants also emphasized the importance of contributing to the development of 
biomedical scientific knowledge. 
P1 [Explaining why he was drawn to the pharmaceutical industry]: The major 
revolutions in the 20th Century were largely around the discovery of new 
therapeutics, most of which were drugs, and so you could be part of change. 
 
Participants acknowledged that there were a number of threats to the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge in the commercial setting, such as the pressure to produce profitable 
products.  
P12: The industry overall has become a little bit slack, a little bit too focused on 
blockbusters, inventing the next atorvastatin rather than inventing the next useful 
antibiotic, which will only sell for $500 million rather than $500 billion. 
 
But the goal remained nonetheless, and industry was seen to have contributed significantly 
to bio-scientific knowledge.  
P7: The classic one is cholesterol-lowering—everybody today uses statins … the 
whole system was discovered by the pharmaceutical industry. This is not statins, this 
is the enzymes, the enzyme cascade… absolutely 100% discovered by the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Commercially-oriented beneficence 
Commercially-oriented beneficence took two main forms: taking care of one’s colleagues, 
and taking care of the company by being a good team member. 
 
Caring for one’s colleagues 
In addition to being concerned for the wellbeing of the community at large, our participants 
emphasized their responsibilities towards their colleagues. It was seen to be important to 
provide learning opportunities for junior staff and help them to develop their careers. 
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P7: [Describing his company]: They are totally, totally focused on getting the right 
people and then looking after them, making sure they are given satisfying lives, 
reward them, surround them. 
 
Participants acknowledged that their efforts in this regard could be threatened by forces 
such as frequent company mergers and lack of mentorship. But the frustration expressed 
about these forces simply underscored the significance to our participants of looking out for 
their colleagues.  
 
Working for the good of the team 
It was also seen by all of our participants to be crucial to be a good “team player.”  
P8 [Re: who is likely to succeed in industry]: you’ve actually got to be a team player, 
that’s where in my experience a lot of clinicians fall down, they’re really used to 
being single entities. Whereas [company] has [thousands of] employees, it’s rare 
that you actually do anything all by yourself.   
 
This entailed, for example, deferring to group decisions when one did not feel too strongly 
about one’s personal view, and putting the good of the team above one’s own personal 
interests. 
P4 [Describing people of whom she disapproves]: Typically for me, that has been 
when they are people who have got their own agenda, and really you’re part of the 
machinery to them, or the group is part of the machinery to them. I find that not 
only disheartening, very disappointing.  
 
Non-maleficence 
Publicly-oriented non-maleficence 
Our participants were all insistent that, despite their commercial responsibilities, the vast 
majority of companies and industry employees would prioritize the safety of patients or 
research participants over any commercial imperatives. Protecting research participants 
primarily involved monitoring clinical trials extremely carefully and stopping trials if there 
was any concern about safety, while protection of patients involved not letting unsafe 
products go to market and withdrawing medicines from the market in the face of safety 
concerns. 
P10: It was just too difficult a drug to leave on the market as a [disease] drug, when 
GPs would be managing it. And I think that was a good call, and the company chose 
to pull it off the market pretty soon after its launch, and I think that was a good call. 
 
To this end, our participants all emphasized that they could and would speak up (at 
least internally) when the company seemed to be acting in a dangerous manner. In most 
cases, participants felt that their concerns would be listened to, but they insisted that they 
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would whistle-blow where necessary and leave a company if they felt ethically 
compromised. 
P9: If you’ve got detrimental information, there’s an ethical obligation to 
communicate it internally. Invariably if it’s communicated internally, they should be 
acting.  And ultimately if they don’t react, people leave and they are whistle blowing.  
 
Commercially-oriented non-maleficence 
Harm to patients and research participants were not the only kinds of harm that were 
salient to our participants. Our participants also felt the need to protect their companies 
from harm—largely by ensuring that processes did not break down and by protecting the 
company’s reputation. 
 
Preventing failed business processes 
Careful preparation for, and oversight of, projects were important ways of preventing a 
major and costly breakdown in process, such as a failed clinical trial or a delayed regulatory 
application. Following guidelines closely was another crucial harm-avoidance strategy. 
P15: Companies will interpret [guidelines] usually in a conservative fashion, because 
understandably … if we get them wrong, our business will fail.  If we submit drug 
marketing applications that the data is considered to be unsuitable because it hasn’t 
been gathered appropriately and we can’t demonstrate the quality, we don’t have a 
business. 
 
Preventing criticism 
In addition to being concerned about the potential for business processes to break down, 
our participants emphasized the need to avoid damaging the company’s reputation.  This 
entailed vetting any external communications that could paint the company in a bad light 
and ensuring that the company’s communications with other stakeholders were objective 
and truthful and could not be faulted. 
P1 [Discussing registration applications]: These documents are very, very carefully 
worded to accurately reflect what the data really means. And one of the motivations 
in that is that if a pharmaceutical company does not do this, then we are truly open 
to criticism of the worst kind. And we will be criticized.  And so it’s not just that 
people are well meaning. There’s a little bit of caution that comes in because of the 
environment in which we work.  
 
Participants also described strict rules of engagement with other stakeholders, 
aimed at avoiding the perception that companies were overstepping their boundaries or 
trying to put pressure on other agencies. 
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Justice 
Publicly oriented justice 
The topic of justice as equitable allocation of resources emerged in several interviews. For 
the most part, it arose in the context of regretful acknowledgments that the pharmaceutical 
industry’s priorities are often not in accord with the unmet needs of the community.  
P12: The most frustrating thing for me personally is I think industry is becoming far 
too fixated on making money, and losing sight of what we are really here to do 
[which] is to provide innovative, high-quality, affordable medicines. 
 
This was in part because of industry’s focus on “western diseases” to the exclusion of global 
health needs and because of the increasing focus on targeted therapies that were beneficial 
to increasingly small sub-populations and were also more expensive. 
P14: We’re focusing on a narrow, narrow population; to generate the return on a 
narrow population you have to multiply the price, it’s a hard reality. And the same 
hard reality is that individuals can’t afford that.  
 
Publicly-oriented justice also comprised issues of “fair play,” and our participants 
emphasized the importance of adhering to regulation, cooperating with other stakeholder 
groups, and being concerned about the wider effects of one’s practices, all for the greater 
good.  
Our participants all went to great pains to describe their conformity with governance 
at all levels including the law, industry guidelines, and company rules and protocols. 
P12: …we operated in a highly professional way, our goal, not that we don’t now, but 
our goal was always to be very highly compliant, not only with our legal and our 
industry standards, but from the moral and ethical point of view. 
 
They emphasized the degree to which they cooperate with other stakeholders for 
the greater good. For example, they saw it as their responsibility to collaborate with 
regulators in finding ways to improve the system for all concerned, and to respond to crises 
in such a way that all interests are accommodated. 
P4: I like the whole strategy of okay how can we get the best outcome for everyone, 
and not make the crisis not be a crisis, but a well-planned, well-organized, so the 
[regulator] is happy with us, the global [company] is happy with us internally, and I 
think most importantly the patient is protected, that’s the bit I probably enjoy the 
most.  
 
It was also seen to be important to support academic researchers, consider national 
resources, and to have a global perspective on the effects of Australian drug development. 
P13: … my feeling was that we, Australia, owe it to our cousins in Asia for example, 
to bear them in mind when we are making our own decisions, or when we develop 
11 | P a g e  
 
our own processes, because what's good for Australia might have these ripples 
elsewhere, so we need to be conscious of that.   
 
Commercially-oriented justice 
In addition to being concerned about equity and fair play in the public sphere, our 
participants were frank about their commitment to their shareholders and their desire to be 
treated fairly by other stakeholders. 
 
Satisfying shareholders 
In thinking about resource allocation, our participants very clear about the fact that they 
worked for companies that had to consider the rights of shareholders as well as those of the 
public. 
P14:  We also have constraints [in] that we get funds from shareholders, and 
shareholders allocate those funds … we must justify a commercial return 
commensurate with the rest of our industry, with our past performance, and with 
other industries as well. 
 
Their talk about justice also focused on issues of “fair play” among the various 
stakeholder groups. For the most part, as described above, they saw themselves, and their 
companies, as being cooperative players in the drug development process, committed to 
procedural justice and to cooperation with other stakeholders. In this context, participants 
were greatly concerned about what they perceived to be ignorance and unwarranted 
criticism of the industry, inadequate financial support, and unrealistic expectations— 
namely, a lack of fair play on the part of other stakeholders. 
P6: The pharmaceutical industry in Australia doesn’t get the same government 
support as it does in Switzerland or the UK, because we haven’t really got much 
home-grown industry… So you will find in a lot of countries overseas that actually 
have R&D based pharmaceutical companies, they treat them better than they do in 
Australia in terms of government support. 
 
Balancing other-ness and firm-ness 
In each of the above domains, a focus on the wellbeing of company and its shareholders 
(firm-ness) was not seen to be incompatible with concern for the public (other-ness). 
Indeed, the two were seen to be mutually reinforcing. 
P15: So if they use [the medicine] right — the right patient, the right time — they get 
much better outcomes and they continue to use it.  Doctors have used medications, 
and [said] ‘won’t touch that again because I had a patient nearly die.’  So you want 
to make sure those things don’t happen, because otherwise it’s bad for business and 
it’s bad for patients. But it’s bad for both.  
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Tensions were, however, acknowledged, and it was seen to be necessary to strike a balance 
(P1) or find a “sweet spot” where both public and commercial goods could be pursued, and 
where both the public and the company could be protected from harm (P2). 
P1: [Describing a compassionate access scheme]: So that was applying compassion, 
but it was applying compassion while keeping an eye on the regulatory environment, 
keeping an eye on the reimbursement environment, keeping an eye on the evidence 
of the action of this drug in a particular disease, and also looking at what the 
financial impact might be on an organization that has an obligation to its 
shareholders, to make sound business decisions.    
 
P2: I liked the philosophy of the company in terms of being very open … and putting 
always the patient first … So patient’s health, ensuring that’s at the forefront, but 
finding the sweet spot where you can make a buck, and do it ethically with the 
patient at the forefront. I like that approach. 
 
Importantly, ensuring the wellbeing of patients and the company were seen to be dual 
responsibilities of those working in medical affairs departments. 
P2: So as a medical person, your responsibility is to make sure the patient is safe, 
and that the company isn’t put at risk and the patients aren’t put at risk.   
 
A degree of “wisdom” was seen as necessary to carry out these balancing acts. No matter 
what the task, it was viewed as crucial to be methodical, objective, and transparent. 
P8: [Re mistakes he has learned from] I think probably maybe…occasionally just 
getting too enthusiastic and a little bit insular.  Because if you live all day every day 
with ‘here’s our wonderful new molecule’, maybe every so often you just lose 
balance … I think sometimes you can lose a bit of objectivity because you get very 
enthusiastic about something.   
 
It was also seen to be necessary to think “strategically” and be able to come up with a 
variety of solutions to problems. 
P2 [Re who is likely to succeed in industry]: I like the strategic kind of things, I like 
being able to think creatively and come up with lots of different solutions and 
different approaches. I like to think through problems … I like[d] the company, I 
thought it was very strategic, it was sort of change-embraced creativity and 
innovation. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Summary  
Our interviews demonstrated that Beauchamp and Childress’ principles provide a useful 
organizing framework for a principle-based pharmaceutical ethics. In aiming for 
beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice, participants had two broad ethical orientations: 
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an altruistic public focus (“other-ness”) and a commitment to their companies (“firm-ness”). 
Our participants also demonstrated efforts to balance these principles or to balance other-
ness and firm-ness within the principles. We have chosen to view both “other-ness” and 
“firm-ness” as ethical positions because they each describe a perspective from which to 
judge acts with moral implications. 
Autonomy did not emerge as a salient principle. This may be because participants 
were being asked to describe their professional lives rather than, for example, how they 
would conduct a clinical trial. Participants did, however, talk freely about patient welfare 
without defining what that might mean. We cannot say for certain, therefore, how those 
working in medical affairs departments of pharmaceutical companies would conceptualize 
autonomy, only that it did not emerge spontaneously in our loosely structured interviews. 
  
Practical implications 
Having described the principles that shape pharmaceutical practice, two questions arise: 
how might these principles be used to address specific ethical dilemmas in pharmaceutical 
practice, and how adequate are they as a normative framework? These questions are best 
answered using a hypothetical, but realistic, case study of a pharmaceutical company with 
regional offices in a number of small countries: 
Jan is the head of the regional clinical trials division of a major global pharmaceutical 
company. She has been asked by the head of global clinical trials to conduct a 
feasibility study in order to determine whether her region would be an appropriate 
site (among others) for a global clinical trial. Jan notices some inconsistencies in the 
consent part of the trial protocol that could potentially put research participants at 
unknown risk because they would not be informed about a rare, but serious, side 
effect of the trial medication. She wants to raise this issue with the global clinical 
trials manager, but her company’s regional Chief Executive Officer does not want her 
to do so in case this jeopardizes their chances of being selected as a site for the trial. 
He is concerned about the trend towards globalization of clinical research, and is 
worried that their clinical trials division will have to close if trials are sent elsewhere. 
What should Jan do? 
 
A principle-based ethics approach to solving this dilemma, using the principles 
derived empirically from our research, would require Jan to balance the communal 
responsibilities that she owes to the general public (other-ness) against those owed to her 
company (firm-ness). In this context, she would need to find a balance between publicly 
oriented non-maleficence (not causing harm to research participants by enrolling them in a 
potentially dangerous trial) and firm-oriented non-maleficence (not causing harm to the 
local company by thwarting its chances of being able to conduct the trial).  She would also 
need to consider the tension between publicly oriented non-maleficence and publicly 
oriented beneficence, because the local population could benefit from being part of a 
cutting edge trial if it gives them access to, and clinical expertise in relation to, a cutting-
edge therapy. The principles of firm-oriented beneficence and justice are also significant 
here, because Jan wants to keep her clinical research team employed and maximize return 
to the local company’s shareholders.  
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Because principles are, by definition, abstract and content-thin, Jan would need to 
specify exactly what each of these principles means in this context, and what each entails in 
a practical sense. This would help her to determine exactly where the conflicts lie. She 
would then need to consider her options. These would include (among other things): saying 
nothing about the inconsistency; immediately reporting the inconsistency to the head of 
global medical affairs; or discussing with her CEO whether there are other options, such as 
contacting other regional clinical trials managers (i.e., others competing to host the trial) 
and sending a joint statement to the global head of clinical research. In considering which 
option is best, Jan would probably want to choose the approach that best balances 
competing principles, as it is unlikely in this instance that any single principle would 
completely trump the others.  
If Jan were able to do this, and articulate her reasoning to all other stakeholders, this 
would be a step in the right direction for pharmaceutical ethics. But the example also 
illustrates the limitations of relying only on those principles that are spontaneously salient 
to industry employees in a single set of interviews. Most notably, if Jan had used a 
framework for normative reasoning that drew only on the principles that were emerged 
empirically in our study, she may not have given sufficient consideration to balancing the 
liberty of research participants against the benefits to the community of conducting the 
trial. For this, Jan would have needed to draw on the principle of respect for autonomy—a 
principle that did not emerge strongly in our data for the reason discussed above. 
A framework for normative reasoning that did not have a central place for autonomy 
would be seriously lacking. While Beauchamp and Childress insisted that none of their 
principles was more foundational than any other, respect for autonomy has been 
considered by many to be the cornerstone of biomedical clinical and research ethics—a 
crucial counterpoint to the paternalism that had arguably dominated medical practice since 
the time of the Hippocratic Oath. Despite a number of refinements and qualifications, the 
principle of individual autonomy remains central in debates about, for example, patient 
rights and consent to medical treatment and research participation (Kerridge et al. 2009), 
and much of medical ethics remains focused on finding ways to balance individual 
autonomy against the demands of beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.  
The failure of our participants to spontaneously emphasize autonomy as an ethical 
principle demonstrates the limitations of using a single empirical study to derive normative 
theory, and underscores the importance of a “wide reflective equilibrium” in which 
empirical data of various kinds are combined with existing normative theory to derive a rich 
and inclusive theory of, for example, pharmaceutical ethics (Daniels 1996; DePaul 2001). 
While we have focused here on Beacuchamp and Childress’ framework, and identified 
autonomy as a “missing” element in our empirical data, it would also be important to 
identify gaps by drawing on other normative theories and ethical reasoning systems such as 
utilitarianism, virtue ethics, or stakeholder analysis. 
 
Resonance with public health ethics 
If we “re-insert” autonomy into our theory of pharmaceutical ethics, then our framework 
becomes highly resonant with the principles underpinning public health ethics. While public 
health ethics is centrally concerned with balancing individual liberties and the advancement 
of health for all, public health ethicists have recognized that this concern is embedded 
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within a broader commitment to ensuring social justice, removing systematic disadvantage, 
and mobilizing communities to do so. Health is viewed as a collective, or common good, 
rather than (just) a property of individuals. As such, public health ethicists have emphasized 
the importance of principles such as connectedness, solidarity, and communal responsibility 
(Coughlin 2008).  
With this in mind, we would suggest that the production of medicines might be 
viewed as a public good, and pharmaceutical ethics as a type of public health ethics. 
Problems in pharmaceutical ethics—as in public health ethics more generally—could 
therefore be divided into two groups. First, there are those problems that are concerned 
with the need to balance individual liberties—such as the autonomy of clinical trial 
participants—against the pursuit of health for all through the development of new 
medicines. Second, there are problems that are concerned with balancing different kinds of 
connectedness, solidarity, and communal responsibilities—such as those owed to the 
general public (other-ness) versus those owed to one’s company (firm-ness). 
 
Whose ethics is pharmaceutical ethics? 
The case above illustrates how someone working in the pharmaceutical industry might use 
principle-based ethics to illuminate and help to justify an approach to solving a morally 
charged problem. But we believe that such an approach could also be used by bioethicists 
and policy-makers who wish to think about and codify the ways in which industry 
employees should respond to day-to-day dilemmas. By putting themselves in the shoes of 
those actually facing such dilemmas, policy-makers would be better positioned to generate 
nuanced and flexible codes of conduct and regulations. 
For those outside the industry to use this kind of thinking in their decisions about 
pharmaceutical policy, there would need to be a more consistent recognition that the 
pharmaceutical industry, while clearly responsible for significant wrongdoing, is not 
inherently evil, and that pharmaceutical policy needs to do more than (just) curtail the 
industry’s power. This does not mean that bioethicists should work within, or consult to, the 
pharmaceutical industry because this is likely to undermine their credibility as ethicists. 
When, for example, the company Eli Lilly established a project called the "Values, Ethics & 
Rationing in Critical Care Task Force," through which they argued that it would be 
“unethical” not to use its expensive treatment for sepsis, the media picked up on the fact 
that academic bioethicists were being paid as part of this project and complained—probably 
rightly in this particular case—that “(t)here is no better way to enlist bioethicists in the 
cause of consumer capitalism than to convince them they are working for social justice” 
(Elliott 2003). We believe, therefore, that it is crucial for bioethicists and policymakers to 
maintain their independence from the pharmaceutical industry, both so that their 
arguments are convincing, and so that they can switch whenever necessary from a 
facilitative (“ethics in industry”) voice to a critical (“ethics of industry”) position. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
We have already discussed the problem with using only a single empirical study to derive an 
ethical framework; in this case it would have led to a discounting of autonomy as an 
important ethical principle. Our research had a number of other limitations, each of which 
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points to the need for further research. First, this was a small qualitative study, and we do 
not know the degree to which our findings are generalizable. Future qualitative research 
might usefully extend to medical affairs departments in other countries, to commercial 
departments in pharmaceutical companies (e.g., sales and marketing divisions), and to 
“parent” companies outside Australia where the commercial ethos may be more 
entrenched.  Second, we cannot make fine distinctions between the sub-groups we studied 
(e.g., clinical trial managers vs. regulatory affairs managers vs. medical directors). Future 
research might focus on teasing out differences among these groups.  
Third, because we were aiming for maximum variability, we did not limit our focus to 
those themes that were generalizable across all interviews. Future research could focus on 
identifying those views that all participants have in common, and on teasing out reasons for 
differences between participants. Fourth, because the first phase of our research sought 
emergent findings, we could not know in advance which themes would prove to be most 
significant and might need “unpacking.” Additional studies could pursue more targeted 
questions with participants about how they specify and balance principles, rather than 
simply allowing this information to emerge from the data.   
Fifth, we acknowledge that it could be argued that our participants were trying to 
present themselves and their industry work in a more favorable light than is warranted. 
Triangulation with other methods (e.g., ethnographic observation and quantitative studies 
of actual industry behaviors) might help to determine the veracity of these accounts. 
Nonetheless, we believe that espoused principles are likely to be significant motivators of 
future behavior, irrespective of the degree to which they have been put into practice in the 
past.  
Finally, we note that qualitative research provides only one perspective on a 
complex phenomenon, and that greater understanding of the workings of the 
pharmaceutical industry would be achieved by combining various qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Of course, in keeping with the principles of Wide Reflective 
Equilibrium (Rawls 2001), it is important to treat these principles as tentative, and subject to 
constant, dialectical, revision in light of contrary arguments or evidence from particular 
cases. 
 
Conclusion 
Society is deeply ambivalent about the pharmaceutical industry. Its presence in society is 
inevitable because vulnerable people need it and because society now expects and 
appreciates its products and services. Society acknowledges this by buying its products and 
supporting the industry through, for example, tax concessions. But the industry is also 
mistrusted because of its record of episodic maleficence, hypocrisy, and evasion of real 
justice, and this generates discomfort among all who depend upon it.  
There are, however, obviously good and principled people working in the industry. 
The pharmaceutical company employees in this study already knew a good deal about 
ethics, but did not have a clear framework for defining or working with the principles they 
espoused. We have generated, critiqued, and enriched an empirically-derived framework of 
principles for use in pharmaceutical practice and policy that should assist those—both inside 
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and outside the industry—who wish to reason more systematically and collaboratively 
about issues in pharmaceutical ethics.  
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